OXYGEN GENERATORS BLAMED FOR 1996 VALUJET 592 ACCIDENT TO BE TESTED BY AD HOC
Forensic Chemistry and Aviation experts today announced the formation of a task group
to resolve the ongoing controversy regarding the cause of the fatal fire aboard ValuJet Flight 592 on May 11, 1996.
The organizers, Dr. Mark R. Hagadone, Ph.D., and Mark E.J. Fay have chartered The 592 Fire Truth Group (592FTG). The
group plans to scientifically test their hypothesis that the oxygen generators aboard 592 MAY NOT have been the cause of Flight
592's fatal fire. The 592FTG will plan, organize, fund, and conduct tests on the same part number oxygen generators that were
carried in Flight 592's forward cargo compartment.
The 592FTG is to be comprised of two distinct panels. One panel will be composed
of recognized experts in the field of fire initiation and propagation, and the second panel will consist of relatives and
friends of the victims of 592, including third party stakeholders, who have a vested interest in determining, to a reasonable
scientific certainty, the actual source and origin of the fire aboard 592.
Dr. Hagadone and Mr. Fay will now focus the efforts of the 592FTG on seating the panels
and obtaining funding in order to conduct the oxygen generator tests.
DR. MARK R. HAGADONE has a Ph.D. in organic chemistry from the University of Hawaii
at Manoa. Dr. Hagadone is a Fellow of the American College of Forensic Examiners and is recognized by Federal, State
and Territorial courts throughout the Pacific Basin as a Technical Expert in the areas of Forensic Chemistry, Toxicology,
Material Sciences and Failure Analysis.
Dr. Hagadone's interest in 592 began with oxygen generator testing that his forensics
lab, Inalab, Inc. (see www.Inalab.com), was contracted to perform in 1996 by one of 592's victims' relatives.
MARK E.J. FAY has a B.S. in Aviation Maintenance Management from Lewis University,
Romeoville, Illinois. Mr. Fay began rebuilding and maintaining airplanes in 1965 in exchange for flying lessons. He
later earned a living as a flight instructor, a commuter airline pilot, and as an FAA licensed Airframe & Powerplant Mechanic.
More recently, Mr. Fay has worked in various capacities for aerospace manufacturers including Bendix, Sundstrand, Textron
Lycoming, Douglas Aircraft Company, and Boeing. After leaving Boeing in 2002, Mr. Fay established www.Airworthy.US,
dedicated to restoring the concept of airworthiness to its role as the foundation upon which commercial/civil aviation rests.
Mr. Fay's interest in 592 began the day of the accident. He was employed at the time by Douglas Aircraft Company, maker of the DC-9 aircraft that was ValuJet Flight
592. The week following the fatal crash of VJ 592, Mr. Fay became involved in
what he believes was an apparent cover-up of illegal electrical parts installed aboard flight 592 that, according to a 1991
Federal Aviation Administration Airworthiness Directive, was issued "To eliminate overheating of primary longitudinal trim
relays and the possibility of fire in the forward cargo compartment."
592 FIRE TRUTH GROUP
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Report NTSB/AAR-97/06 states, as a matter-of-fact, that the
May 11, 1996 ValuJet Flight 592 accident "resulted from a fire in the airplane's class D cargo compartment
that was initiated by the actuation of one or more oxygen generators being improperly carried as cargo." The NTSB was so myopically focused on that fact that the
only subsequent probable causes allowed “were (1) the failure of SabreTech to properly prepare,
package, and identify unexpended chemical oxygen generators before presenting
them to ValuJet for carriage; (2) the failure of ValuJet to properly oversee
its contract maintenance program to ensure compliance with maintenance, maintenance training, and hazardous materials requirements
and practices; and (3) the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
to require smoke detection and fire suppression systems in class D cargo compartments.”
of the Board’s public conclusions, there continues to be controversy regarding
the validity of the determinations
conducted by the NTSB on the
same, and similar, part number oxygen generators as were carried aboard ValuJet Flight 592.
Those determinations formed the basis for the foregone conclusion that the oxygen generators initiated
the resulting catastrophic fire.
of the continuing controversy, the 592 Fire Truth Group (592FTG) has been formed. The 592FTG's purpose, as delineated in the Charter, is to determine, insofar as is physically possible, if the
Scott Aviation oxygen generators could possibly have self-actuated, and if so, if the external temperature
generated by the oxygen generators was sufficient in both duration and magnitude to ignite material in the
forward cargo compartment. The Group will plan, organize, fund, and conduct tests
on the same Scott Aviation oxygen generators as were carried in Flight 592's forward cargo compartment.
group is composed of two distinct "panels of stakeholders;" one is an independent panel of recognized experts in the
field of fire initiation and propagation (hereafter referred to as the "expert" panel).
other is a panel composed of relatives and friends of the victims of ValuJet
Flight 592, and includes third parties who have a vested interest in determining, to a reasonable scientific certainty, the
source and origin of the fire aboard Flight 592. This panel
(hereafter referred to as the "lay" panel) serves as administrators
providing budgetary oversight and assuming responsibility for organizing and distributing all germane correspondence, reports,
and similar for all stakeholders, both expert and lay in character.
expert panel, through its chairperson, has authority and responsibility to develop controlled and scientifically peer reviewed
experimental protocols in accordance with commonly acceptable scientific principles, and to conduct such experiments, tests
or challenges according to the pre-approved experimental test plan following the scientific method
(14CFR Part 25, Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes, section 25.1450 Chemical Oxygen Generators, may be
consulted, but is considered a minimum standard, not an exhaustive scientific testing outline). This plan or protocol will be designed to address as many significant concerns of the
technical and lay stakeholders as is possible while operating under the constraints of the
Charter. This panel will also approve the test facility, the
dates of such testing and the attendance / witnessing protocol.
lay panel will consist at minimum of a Secretary and a Treasurer and is responsible, under the guidance of the
expert panel, to search for, and obtain agreements with, a nationally or internationally recognized testing laboratory / facility
for the purpose of conducting the oxygen generator tests.
lay panel is responsible for arranging travel and hotel accommodations for those technical experts, and lay panel members
if any, deemed necessary to be present to conduct / monitor the actual testing protocol.
It is also responsible to disburse funds in the pursuit of reaching
the Group's goals, and otherwise manage funds established for the purpose set forth
in this charter, including recording all donations to the fund and all disbursements from the fund.
MARCH 2004 - THE 5/11 CONSPIRACY & ELECTION
As additional information is obtained, the evidence is mounting that the cover-up was a much wider web of
conspiracy and obstruction of justice than originally believed.
While the FAA was bent on preventing the populace from learning that a bogus part was the cause
of 110 deaths, the White House was intent on maintaining the delusion that recent start-up airlines provided safe commercial
air transportation, on a level equivalent to the major carriers, to a segment of the population previously unable to
Several high-level governmental heads rolled following Flight 592's crash, SabreTech became the proverbial
"punished innocent bystander," ValuJet, the not-so-innocent, was rewarded by being allowed to stay in business, and Bill
Clinton became the first Democrat elected to a second term as President in 60 years.
NOVEMBER 2003 - SECOND FOIA RESPONSE:
In early October 2003, Airworthy.US submitted a second FOIA request, this time for the entire file on the
P/N 9207-10296 SUPs investigation. The response was received on November 19, 2003.
The investigation file provides a good deal of information. Noteworthy is that the file, in the final
report, determined that Leach International violated 14CFR 21.303, and that primary longitudinal trim relay P/N 9207-10296
was unapproved until Leach received PMA on May 29, 1996. Leach, according to the report, never admitted violating the
The report raises many questions however. Why is the first document in it, aside from the SUPs
Report filed on 5/13/96, dated 6/11/96 - one month after the ValuJet 592 accident, and 13 days after Leach was granted
Also, why wasn't American Airlines, purchasers of the parts that were the subject of the Suspected Unapproved
Parts Notification report, mentioned in the investigation report?
Additionally, the investigation determined that the relays, a total of 350 according to Leach records,
were airworthy even though Leach did not produce P/N 9207-10296 relays in accordance with the requirements of PMA
(14 CFR 21.303) until May 29, 1996, when the FAA granted Leach PMA. How did the FAA travel back in time to review
the production of those 350 relays?
Leach was fined $100,000 according to the file. It does not say whether Leach ever paid that fine.
The investigation file supports Airworthy.US' claim that the longitudinal trim relay, P/N 9207-10296, installed
on ValuJet 592 was an unapproved part.
According to FAA Airworthiness Directive AD 91-21-07, relay 9207-10296 could have started the fire
that claimed 110 lives on that fateful May day in 1996.
OCTOBER 2003 - FOIA RESPONSE:
In early September, Airworthy.US submitted a Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) request for the Suspected Unapproved
Parts Notification that was filed about the time of ValuJet 592's accident .
On October 1, 2003, Airworthy.US received a copy of the Suspected Unapproved Parts Notification that was filed
by an FAA Inspector at Dallas-Ft. Worth on May 13, 1996 against eight longitudinal trim relays, part number 9207-10296.
According to the Suspected Unapproved Parts Notification, the relays were discovered at American Airlines
supply warehouse at DFW Airport on May 13, 1996! That was the Monday following the Saturday crash of ValuJet Flight
Was the inspector there by mere coincidence? If so, it ranks as one of the most extraordinary coincidences
of all time.
The FAA was well aware of the illegal nature of the part. Why didn't the FAA post the Unapproved Parts
Notification on the FAA's Unapproved Parts Notification website? Visit the FAA Unapproved Parts Notification
site via the link, above and to the right.
AUGUST 2003 - SUP REPORT WAS FILED!:
Combing through notes taken during May and June, 1996, in the ongoing effort to uncover leads and objective
evidence, Airworthy.US discovered a previously overlooked revelation; a Suspected Unapproved Parts Notification, FAA Form
8120-11, was filed circa May-June 1996, on the longitudinal trim relay, part number 9207-10296!
The FAA was fully aware of the bogus/unapproved/illegal relay. The official FAA form had been submitted to
the FAA's Suspected Unapproved Parts Program Office! The reported parts were not even new, but were acquired on the used/surplus
parts market in unknown condition by American Airlines, whose parent, AMR, was ValuJet's maintenance contractor at Dallas-Fort
Worth, according to the NTSB report!
The FAA site, Unapproved Parts Notifications (see link, above - right) lists nothing about the relay, or the
The NTSB report fails to mention anyhting about the SUP Notification, or the relay.
Mary Schiavo has informed Airworthy.US that the case can be re-opened if cover-up can be proved.
The first step is to provide evidence that the FAA covered-up the bogus/unapproved/illegal longitudinal trim
relays. Airworthy.US has provided testimony above. It is not enough to warrant re-opening the case by itself, however.